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PREFACE 
The effects of electromagnetic interference can be very detrimental to electronic systems 
utilized in space missions. Assuring that subsystems and systems are electrically compatible is an 
important engineering function necessary to assure mission success. 
This reference publication will acquaint the reader with spacecraft electronic systems failures 
and anomalies caused by electromagnetic interference, and will show the importance of electro- 
magnetic compatibility activities in conjunction with space flight programs. It is also hoped that the 
report will illustrate that evolving electronic systems are increasingly sensitive to electromagnetic 
interference, and that NASA personnel must continue to diligently pursue the electromagnetic 
compatibility on spaceflight systems. 
This reference publication was developed by the Electromagnetics and Environments Branch, 
Systems Analysis and Integration Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center. The Branch is actively 
engaged in various electromagnetic compatibility activities. 
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REFERENCE PUBLICATION 
ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS FAILURES AND ANOMALIES ATTRIBUTED TO 
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This report is to acquaint the reader with spacecraft electronic systems failures and anoma- 
lies caused by electromagnetic interference (EMI), show the importance of electromagnetic compat- 
ibility (EMC) activities in conjunction with space flight programs, and provide an investigation into 
the history of some well-known EM1 system failures and anomalies in military and commercial elec- 
tronic systems. Military and commercial systems are included due to the limited number of in-flight 
spacecraft failures and anomalies attributed to EM1 that have occurred on National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) programs. The inclusion of nonspace systems also helps to illustrate 
that evolving electronic systems are increasingly sensitive to EM1 and NASA personnel must con- 
tinue to be diligent in the pursuit of EMC on space flight systems. 
NASA in-flight and preflight case histories, aircraft, ship and automobile case histories, and 
medical and commercial electronic equipment case histories are included. Several are unpublished 
anecdotes by NASA or contractor personnel involved in a particular project or program. Known in- 
flight anomaly cases are from published accounts of problems in NASA reports and data bases. Pub- 
lished data on aircraft and ship cases are not readily obtainable because it was often difficult to 
identify the cause of system upsets. In cases involving commercial incidents, manufacturers and 
service providers were often reluctant to discuss or publish issues that affect liability or the “bottom 
line.”’ Although for security reasons documented case histories concerning military aircraft are 
usually unavailable, several published anomalies are included despite filtered details. 
Numerous case histories exist of spacecraft failures or anomalies attributed to EM1 from 
spacecraft charging. This phenomenon, which occurs when an orbiting spacecraft accumulates electric 
charge from the natural space plasma, is not included in this report. A separate, similar report is in 
process to document failures and anomalies caused by spacecraft charging. 
An electromagnetic incompatibility occurs when a system or equipment interferes with 
another system or equipment. When this interaction is traced to the transfer of electromagnetic 
energy from the culprit to the victim, it is termed EMI. EMC denotes the electromagnetically 
compatible, simultaneous operation of systems and equipment. 
EMC, also defined as the absence of EMI, is an important element in the success of the 
NASA space flight programs. This report highlights the NASA EMC participation in past space 
program successes and its critical role in future activities. 
Computer Science Corporation developed this report for MSFC Electromagnetics and 
Environments Branch, Mail Code EL54. Hopefully a better understanding of these failures and 
anomalies and associated causes will enable NASA engineers and prograin managers to more effec- 
tively minimize program risks and costs, optimize design quality, and successfully achieve mission 
objectives. 
2.0 HISTORY 
The NASA track record of EM1 problems on operational spacecraft is a good one. Research of 
spacecraft anomalies attributed to EM1 shows limited occurrences of in-flight anomalies.* 3 The pri- 
mary reason for this success is that NASA EMC personnel recognized potential problems during 
design and testing and used “lessons learned” to maximum advantage. 
Application of EM1 theory started during World War I1 when knowledge of the nature of EM1 
was used in the design and construction of wiring harnesses on military aircraft to prevent problems 
due to radiated e m i ~ s i o n s . ~  Another application was maintaining electromagnetic compatibility of on- 
board radar systems with other electrical flight systems. Since then, even though electrical/electronic 
systems continued to become more complex and more susceptible to EMI, the problem faced by 
EMC personnel remained one of essentially recognizing, detecting, and controlling the existence and 
location of culprit and victim systems, instead of EM1 suppression techniques which have changed 
little over the last 50 years. Applications and technologies that comprise suppression techniques, 
however, have changed greatly. 
I 2.1 NASA Preflight Case Histories 
I From the beginning space flight programs, NASA EMC personnel drew on previous military experience to evaluate and design for EMC. This contributed not only to successful designs but also 
to solid preflight testing and checkout procedures. Preflight activities uncovered many potential 
problems before they became in-flight anomalies or failures. These “lessons learned” established 
the building blocks for a solid EMC foundation. Numerous anomalies detected during preflight activi- 
ties that contributed to the NASA experience base are described in the following. 
2.1.1 Saturn Beat Frequency Case 
During on-pad checkout at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) prior to one of the early devel- 
opmental test flights of the Saturn launch vehicle, the range safety receivers detected an extraneous 
signal. Because these receivers processed commands for engine cutoff, arm, and destruct, a thorough 
investigation was conducted to determine the cause of this unintended signal transmission. The 
problem appeared to be the production of spurious signals originating from the sum and difference 
combinations possible when signals frequencies are mixed. Although technically these spurious sig- 
nals are not beat frequencies (associated with sound energy), this particular case is known within 
NASA as the beat frequency case and is maintained in this report by that title. The spurious signals 
were caused by the multitude of transmitters located on board to collect test data. Analysis deter- 
mined that spurious signal frequencies very near the frequency of the range safety receivers were 
one of the vehicle’s tracking transponders. Further investigation determined that mixing sources for 
the signals were the hinged cable tray covers and chain handrails on the gantry. This insight and 
analysis proved to be useful later. With a Saturn vehicle on pad, the range safety receivers detected 
a spurious command signal for engine cutoff from a Titan launch vehicle checkout on the next pad. 
The Titan was using the same modulation frequencies on a different carrier frequency for its range 
safety receivers. A signal sent to the Titan vehicle was also received by the tracking transponder on 
the Saturn vehicle. The retransmitted signal of the transponder was mixed with certain telemetry 
signals resulting in the false engine cutoff command. After this incident, the decision was made to fly 
with the culprit transponder inactive (eventually it was removed from the vehicle). Later, both 
I 
I produced by a combination of frequencies from several telemetry transmitters in combination with 
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Figure 1. Saturn V launch. 
telemetry and range safety transmissions were moved to a higher frequency range where the pro- 
duction of spurious signals did not interfere with the range safety ~ y s t e m . ~  
2.1.2 Range Safety Interference 
In another incident related to the range safety system on a Saturn vehicle, the range safety 
receivers detected a low-level signal from somewhere in the KSC vicinity. This signal was not 
always present. The possibility of signal mixing, detailed in the previous case, was considered and 
all radio stations and mobile transmitters in the area were investigated-no spurious signals 
detected. KSC and MSFC EMC personnel worked all one night trying to solve the problem. At one 
point soon after the signal suddenly stopped, one of the MSFC EMC personnel stepped outside the 
small trailer used to house test equipment, noticed daybretlk had occurred and searchlights 
surrounding the vehicle had turned off. On his request, they were turned on again and the unwanted 
signal reappeared. Further investigation revealed the searchlights were carbon arc lamps that 
produced a broadband radio frequency (RF) signal and the lamp reflectors beamed the signal directly 
to the range safety antennas on the ~ e h i c l e . ~  
3 
2.1.3 Skylab Shielding 
During checkout of the Skylab Apollo telescope mount, an EMC test was conducted that 
illuminated the entire Skylab with various Skylab transmitter frequencies. This test revealed the 
telemetry and measuring systems lacked proper shielding. The undetected deficiency would result in 
degraded or useless data transmission to scientists on the g r ~ u n d . ~  
Figure 2. Shuttle payload bay. 
2.1.4 RAU Transient Susceptibility 
The remote acquisition units (RAU’s) are data transmission interfaces between Shuttle 
Spacelab payload experiments and experiment controllers on the ground. An RAU is designed to 
shutdown if its voltage drops below a certain level for a certain time period. During checkout of 
Spacelab payloads at KSC, RAU’s experienced numerous shutdowns when various items of equip- 
ment were turned on or off. MSFC EMC personnel were called to conduct a problem investigation 
that determined the test setup used for preflight tests of Spacelab payloads did not accurately simu- 
late fuel cell capacitance and line impedance. A representative capacitance was used in the proper 
location, power-up problems ceased, and testing proceeded unhindered. Solving this problem pro- 
duced a valuable understanding of susceptibility of RAU’s to transient signals. Another result of this 
investigation was the formulation of an EM1 test requirement to insure that RAU’s do not fail due to 
operation of experimental equipment.5 
2.1.5 Frog Embryology Expefiment (FEE) 
The FEE was part of the Spacelab (SL-J) mission flown on STS-47 launched September 12, 
1992. Prior to the flight, EMC data indicated that a potential problem existed with turnon transients 
4 
that could cause an RAU problem. MSFC EMC personnel developed an incremental startup proce- 
dure to apply during preflight testing. Data from this procedure determined a potential problem still 
existed. A second startup procedure was implemented that indicated no in-orbit problems were 
likely to occur. No in-flight anomalies were reported.6 
2.1.6 Aquatic Animal Experiment Unit (AAEU) Experiment 
The AAEU was part of the International Microgravity Laboratory (IML-2) mission flown on 
STS-65 launched July 8, 1994. Prior to launch, MSFC EMC personnel discovered that the experi- 
ment might produce turnon transients detrimental not only to AAEU but also to other mission exper- 
iments. Recognition of this potential problem prompted the launch team to alter KSC integrated con- 
figuration test (ICT) and assembly procedures to allow detection of possible anomalies. It was 
determined that no problems were likely to occur in orbit, and none were reportede7 
2.1.7 Spinal Changes in Microgravity (SCM) Experiment 
The SCM, part of the IML-2 mission, flew aboard STS-65. SCM personnel experienced an 
alternating current (ac) interference problem in the lab, worried it might occur during flight, and 
requested a check at KSC ICT. MSFC EMC personnel developed a worst-case test procedure and 
found that a portable fluorescent light was causing the EMI. Payload operating procedures were 
modified to eliminate the potential EM1 problem. No in-flight anomalies were reported.7 
2.1.8 Linear Compressor Enhanced Orbiter Refrigerator Freezer (LCEORF) 
The LCEORF was part of the IML-2 mission flown aboard STS-65. During preflight EM1 
testing of the LCEORF, it failed to meet the NSTS requirement for peak-to-peak voltage. There was 
also the possibility that its operation could interfere with other experiments utilizing the same power 
bus. Extensive current and voltage variation testing was conducted, with the conclusion that opera- 
tion of the LCEORF would not be a problem on the mission. It was recommended, however, that a 
redesign be made prior to subsequent missions. No in-flight anomalies were reported.7 
2.2 NASA In-Flight Case Histories 
Most potential problems wzre identified and corrected during the developmental process as 
evidenced by the very limited number of documented in-flight anomalies. 
2.2.1 Spacelab Payload General Support Computer (PGSC) 
EM1 occurred during the STS-47 flight when the Spacelab intercom operated in the vicinity of 
the PGSC. EMC personnel predicted that EM1 problems would occur with the PGSC (it was com- 
mercial off-the-shelf (COTS)) affecting other equipment operating over a wide range of frequencies. 
The lesson learned suggested that EM1 performance of COTS hardware should be reviewed for EM1 
prior to purchase.8 
2.2.2 Wake Shield Experiment 
The wake shield was an experiment, towed behind STS-60, launched February 3, 1994, to 
create a better quality vacuum than was available within the orbiter. Failure occurred because the 
small satellite used in the experiment could not be deployed due to EM1 with its attitude control 
system. The EM1 was caused by inductive coupling (crosstalk) between the unshielded attitude 
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control sensor cable and the power bus of the spacecraft. The control systems cable was redesigned 
and shielding added. This was an unpleasant lesson learned at the cost of a failed experiment.* 
2.2.3 Vacuum Cleaner Incident 
During a Spacelab mission in 1985, the crew decided to use the middeck vacuum cleaner 
instead of the one in the lab. Switching the middeck vacuum on caused the voltage to drop and the 
RAU to shut off. In preflight EM1 tests, the vacuum cleaner had not been tested and should not have 
been used in the lab. This case shows how careful and attentive one must be when dealing with 
EMC.5 
2.2.4 Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) Transponder Problems 
This NASA satellite experiment, launched from STS-37 on April 7, 1991, experienced a 
transponder lockup that prevented the spacecraft from receiving command signals. EM1 from a 
ground source, in combination with a design problem, was the lockup cause. A work-around method 
was devised to unlock the transponder when EM1 occurred. The satellite experienced a 13-h loss of 
communications in June 1991 and a 13'/2-h loss in August of that same year; both losses were due to 
transponder lockup.9 
2.2.5 NOAA-11 Phantom Commands 
NOAA-11 is a weather satellite launched September 24, 1988, and operated by NASA for 
the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). In September 199 1, a series 
of phantom commands were observed and determined to be caused by EM1 due to a noisy very high 
frequency (VHF) en~i ronment .~  
2.2.6 NOAA-12 Problems With the VHF Environment 
The NOAA-12 weather satellite was launched May 14, 1991. In September 1991, it experi- 
enced phantom commands when it  flew over Europe. Controllers determined the commands were due 
to susceptibility of the satellite to the heavy commercial VHF environment over Europe. The phan- 
tom commands were countermanded from the ground without serious con~equences.~ 
2.2.7 Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE) Data Loss 
The EUVE was launched June 7, 1992. In October and November of that year, EM1 caused 
data loss in satellite transmissions to Earth.Io 
This short list of documented in-flight EM1 cases reflects the diligent effort in design, proce- 
dures, standards, and preflight testing for EMC. Considering the complexity and scale of electrical 
and electronics systems in spacecraft and payloads, it makes that effort most impressive. To rest on 
past laurels, however, is not prudent or possible because electrical and electronics systems continue 
to evolve rapidly. 
The seemingly continuous stream of technological advances in electronics has important 
future implications for EMC in regard to spacecraft and spacecraft payloads. The effects of electro- 
magnetic interactions in electrical/electronics systems are of evergrowing concern because of the 
increasing susceptibility of system components to EMI, use of automated electronic systems, and 
pollution of the EME with electromagnetic emissions.' 1 All these have significant impact on 
6 
state-of the-art electronic systems, through increased sensitivity to EMI. EM1 problems are preva- 
lent enough that on December 1, 1994, CBS’s investigative reporting TV program “Eye-to-Eye’’ 
presented a segment on EM1 problems with aircraft, automobiles, and medical equipment. 
2.3 Non-NASA Case Histories 
Because of the limited number of in-flight spacecraft failures and anomalies on NASA pro- 
grams attributed to nonspacecraft charging EMI, 17 documented cases for military and commercial 
aircraft, ships, automobiles, and medical equipment are included in this report. As advanced elec- 
tronics systems migrate their way into spacecraft and spacecraft payload systems, these cases indi- 
cate the potential EMC problems that future space programs must deal with. 
2.3.1 Aircraft/Ship/Automobile Cases 
2.3.1.1 U.S.S. Forrestal 
In 1967 off the coast of Vietnam, a Navy jet landing on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Forrestal 
experienced the uncommanded release of munitions that struck a fully armed and fueled fighter on 
deck (fig. 3). The results were explosions, the deaths of 134 sailors, and severe damage to the 
carrier and aircraft. This accident was caused by the landing aircraft being illuminated by carrier- 
based radar, and the resulting EM1 sent an unwanted signal to the weapons system. Investigations 
showed that degraded shield termination on the aircraft allowed the radar frequency to interfere with 
routine operations. As a result of this case, system level EMC requirements were revised to include 
special considerations for electroexplosive devices. I *  
t 
Figure 3. Aftermath of U.S.S. Forrestal EM1 incident. 
2.3.1.2 Power Down Case 
An anecdote was related to the author concerning a U.S. Navy vessel on shakedown maneu- 
vers. While underway at full power, suddenly and unexpectedly a power shutdown occurred. I t  was 
determined that high frequency (HF) transmissions caused an oil pressure sensor to falsely sense a 
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low reading. Before engineers could intervene, the false signal caused a shutdown signal in the 
automated power control system.I3 
2.3.1.3 PIONEER Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) 
PIONEER was an RPV with nondevelopmental item (NDI) status. It was essentially a 
nonmilitary specification item that relied on COTS hardware. Because of this, the Navy anticipated 
EM1 problems during a test flight in January 1987 aboard the U.S.S. Zowa. The RPV pilot, using a 
portable remote control box, experienced a series of uncommanded control transfers between his 
remote control box and another used by a student pilot. These uncommanded signals caused loss of 
control and a crash landing. There were also instances during other RPV flights of anomalous signals 
and switching. Subsequent investigation found that the remote control boxes received EM1 from HF 
communication transmitting antennas located aboard the Zowa that coupled into the box due to 
inadequate shielding and cable termination. Utilizing improved cables and cable connectors, proper 
shielding, filters, and internal logic changes corrected the problem. The HF signal caused other 
problems with the RPV internal systems, but eventual modifications also corrected these. Generally, 
use of COTS hardware makes the hardening of electronics necessary to protect them from the very 
harsh EME found aboard Navy ~ e s s e 1 s . l ~  
2.3.1.4 H.M.S. Sheffield Catastrophe 
I During the Falklands War, the British Ship H.M.S. Shefield sank with heavy casualties after 
being hit by an Exocet missile. Despite the Sheffield having the most sophisticated antimissile 
defense system available, the system created electromagnetic interference to radio communications 
to and among the contingent of Harrier jets assigned to the ship. While the Harriers took off and 
landed, the missile defense was disengaged to allow communications with the jets and provided a , 
I window of opportunity for the Exocet missile. 
2.3.1.5 B-52 Stability Case 
When op-amp-based flight control systems were first added to the B-52 bomber autopilot 
stability augmentation system, use of the HF radio resulted in the uncommanded activation of all 
rear empennage flight control surfaces. The wiring system, which had not been changed, was found 
potentially dangerous problem that had not existed before using the new technology.g 
I to be susceptible to HF. This was a case of using new (at that time) technology and introducing a 
2.3.1.6 B-52 Missile Interface Unit 
During a B-52 missile interface unit  test, an uncommanded missile launch signal was given. 
One of the contributing factors was crosstalk in the systems wiring. Another factor was not adhering 
to the EMC control plan requirements. The outcome was a year-long redesign and test effort.8 
2.3.1.7 UH-60 Blackhawk Case 
An Army Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, while flying past a radio broadcast tower in 
West Germany in 1987, experienced an uncommanded stabilator movement. Spurious warning light 
indications and false cockpit warnings were also reported. Subsequent investigation and testing 
showed that the stabilator system was affected by EM1 from high intensity radiated fields (HIRF). 
The Blackhawk has a conventional mechanically linked flight control system with hydraulic assist. 
The stabilator system, however, uses transmitted digital signals (fly-by-wire) to automatically 
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adjust its position relative to control and flight parameters. These digital signals are highly suscep- 
tible to HIRF. When the Blackhawk was initially designed, the Army did not routinely fly near large 
RF emitters. The Navy version of the Blackhawk, the SB-60 Seahawk, however, has not experi- 
enced similar EM1 problems because it is hardened against the severe EME aboard modern ships. 
Despite the Army identifing several hundred worldwide emitters that could cause problems and 
instructing its pilots to observe proper clearance dist.ances, between 1981 and 1987 five Blackhawk 
helicopters crashed and killed or injured all on board. In each crash, the helicopter flew too near radio 
transmitters. The long-term solution was to increase shielding of sensitive electronics and provide 
as a backup some automatic control resets.15 l 6  
2.3.1.8 AH-64 Apache Helicopter 
The Apache helicopter (fig. 4)  was designed primarily as an airborne antitank weapon to 
provide quick-strike capability against tanks and armored vehicles. The Apache is essentially an 
electronic device with multiple electric and electronic systems that control navigating and fighting 
abilities. During early missions, pilots complained that HIRF signals interfered with electronics. In 
one case, EM1 triggered an overspeed condition that could have resulted in double engine failure. 
Subsequent reports showed that the aircraft was susceptible to low-level emitters such as commer- 
cial microwave, television, and airport and missile radar. At one point, the Army concluded that the 
Apache should not be used on aircraft carriers. After determining that the source of unwanted signals 
was coupling in the I/O cables, the shielding was redesigned; but not before many costly aircraft 
were built with EM1 deficiencies.]2 
Figure 4. AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. 
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2.3.1.9 F-117A Targeting Lockon 
During development of the F-l17A fighter, EM1 problems occurred in the targeting lockon 
system. Use of poor shielding techniques and old hardware designs caused these problems, which 
I after considerable testing and redesign were ultimately solved. 17 
2.3.1.10 F-16 Flight Controls 
An F-16 fighter jet crashed in the vicinity of a Voice of America (VOA) radio transmitter 
because its fly-by-wire flight control system was susceptible to the HIRF transmitted. Since the 
F-16 is inherently unstable, the pilot must rely on the flight computer to fly the aircraft. Subse- 
quently, many of the F-16's were modified to prevent this type EMI, caused by inadequate military 
specifications on that particular electronics system. This F-16 case history was one of the drivers for 
institution by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of the HIRF certification program.8 
2.3.1.11 Blimp Problems 
Another VOF transmitter case involved a blimp over Greenville, NC. Flying near the VOA 
transmitter, the blimp suddenly had double engine failure. The flight crew followed emergency proce- 
dures and made a successful unpowered landing. An investigation determined that the failure of the 
ignition system was extreme EMI. Subsequent to this event, blimps were outfitted with ignition 
systems protected from HF transmissions. 
2.3.1.12 Boeing 747 Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) 
A Boeing employee related this incident. During testing, audio reception on the Boeing 747 
communications receivers was unacceptable while the ADF system was in use. Investigation 
showed that wire-to-wire coupling was the problem because the ADF antenna lead was not sepa- 
rated far enough from other wiring.* 
2.3.1.13 Severmorsk Disaster 
In mid-May 1984, a Soviet ammunition depot exploded. The cause of the accident, according 
to the Soviets, was an over-the-horizon radar that had illuminated the depot.'6 
2.3.2.14 Tornado Fighter Case 
Another VOA HIRF case occurred in 1984 near Munich, Germany. A West German Tornado 
fighter crashed after flying too close to a powerful VOA transmitter.I6 
2.3.1.15 Libyan Strike 
In 1986 during the US air strike on Libya, several missiles failed to strike designated targets 
and an F-1 1 1  fighter crashed. Air Force officials blamed these incidents on EM1 caused by U.S. air- 
craft transmissions interfering with each other.16 
2.3.1.16 Antilock Biaking System (ABS) Failure 
Early ABS systems on both aircraft and automobiles were susceptible to EMI. Accidents 
occurred when the brakes functioned improperly because EM1 disrupted the ABS control system. 1 
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For aircraft, the initial solution was to provide a manual switch to lock out the ABS function when it  
was inoperable due to EM1 and to use the normal braking system. Later, the solution was to qualify 
prior to flight the ABS system based on the expected EME. For automobile systems, the solution 
was to ensure, if EM1 occurs, that the ABS system degrade gracefully to normal braking-ssen- 
tially an automatic version of the aircraft manual switch. Eventually, automobile ABS was qualified 
by EM1 testing prior to procurement.8 
’ Cellular Phone 
l Laptop Computer 
Radio 
Electronic Game 
CD Player 
Tape Player 
AM-FM Recorder 
AM-FM Walkman 
Dictaphone 
Heart Monitor 
Television 
2.3.1.17 Mercedes-Benz Case 
Navigation Aids 
4 
3 
3 
I 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
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During the early years of ABS’s, Mercedes-Benz automobiles equipped with ABS had 
severe braking problems along a certain stretch of the German autobahn. The brakes where affected 
by a near-by radio transmitter as drivers applied them on the curved section of highway. The near- 
term solution was to erect a mesh screen along the roadway to attenuate the EMI. This enabled the 
brakes to function properly when drivers applied them. 
Communications 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
0 
4 
2.3.2 Aircraft Passenger Carry-on Devices Cases 
VOR 
3 
2 
0 
2 
I 
0 
I 
I 
I 
0 
0 
I I  
Passenger carry-on devices provide another group of case histories. They show the increased 
susceptibility to external EM1 sources that modern automated electronic systems aboard aircraft 
experience. This external EM1 is generated by seemingly innocuous electronic devices, which include 
portable computers, AM-FM “walkman” cassette players, dictaphones, radios, heart monitors, and 
cellular phones. 
Totals 
8 
5 
4 
3 
2 
2 
I 
1 
I 
2 
I 
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NASA maintains a data base, known as the FAA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
and administered by Battelle, which is a compilation of voluntary reports detailing safety problems 
submitted by pilots or crew members flying a wide variety of commercial and private aircraft. These 
reports are, for the most part, anonymous with nonspecific aircraft models and unidentified operating 
companies. At present, the data base contains 46,798 full-form reports submitted since January 1 ,  
1986. This author requested an ASRS data base to find all cases that referenced passenger carryon 
electronic devices.18 The results were 56 citations, of which 29 appear definitely to be EM1 caused 
anomalies. Twelve other cases could be EM1 related, but additional information is required to make 
this determination. Table 1 contains a tabulation of the 29 EM1 events by affected equipment and 
suspected cause. 
Table 1. Pilodcrew reports of EM1 caused by passenger carryon devices. 
Suspected Cause 
Totals 
1 1  
Apparently, operational frequencies of cellular phones, computers, radios, and electronic 
I games are often EM1 culprit sources. Many airlines have established rules forbidding or limiting the 
use of these devices. A special report by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) 
concluded that a culprit carryon device has to operate at a frequency that falls within the operating 
frequency of a particular aircraft system, and that the device probably has to be oriented with its 
maximum radiation directed out a nearby window for navigation and communication antennas to pick 
up the emitted radiation.19 A particularly interesting case from the ASRS search was one whereby 
the pilot of a large aircraft actually performed an experiment with a passenger and his laptop com- 
puter. The pilot asked the passenger to switch the computer on and off for varying time intervals 
while he monitored the effect on the aircraft VOR. The pilot reported it was very evident that the 
computer affected his flight instruments. 
One well-known EM1 case is not included in the ASRS data base. In February, 1993, a 
DC-10 autopilot was disrupted during final landing approach by a battery-powered CD player oper- 
ated by a passenger in first-class. To prevent the aircraft from crashing after suddenly veering off 
course, the pilot had to manually take control of the aircraft. 
2.3.3 Medical Equipment Cases 
Modem medical equipment have experienced EM1 problems. From 1979 to 1993, the FDA 
received over 90 reports concerning EM1 problems in the field.20 These reports are shown in table 2 
by EM1 categories defined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and by equipment type. 
Silverberg pointed out in his article that users experiencing medical equipment performance degrada- 
tion may not suspect EM1 as a possible cause. Thus, EM1 problems are more likely to be under 
reported to the FDA than other equipment problems. 
Table 2. Cross tabulation of FDA medical device EM1 problem reports. 
C m  No. Radiated Interference No. Maonetic Interference No. ESD - No. 
Bloodcell Counter 
Blood Warner 
Cardiac Monitor 
Defibrillator 
Ventilator ( ID) 
UV Phototherapy Unit 
Infant Incubators 
Infusion Device 
Intra-aortic Balloon Pump 
Laparoscopy System 
Radiation Therapy Device 
Physiological Monitor 
Oxygen Monitor 
I 
I 
5 
2 
2 
2 
I 
2 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
Totals 20 
*(#D) = number of deaths. 
Fetal Heartbeat Monitor 
Blood Pressure Monitor 
Infusion Pump 
Pacemaker (ID)* 
Vascular Recorder 
Cardiac Monitor (3D) 
Defibrillator 
Ventilator 
Neo-natal Monitor 
Chiropractic Table 
Nerve Simulator 
Pulse Oximeter 
Microsurgical Drill 
Radiant Warmer 
Laparoscopy System 
HeatedHumidi fier 
Blood Warmer 
Telemetry Monitors 
Gas Monitor 
Apnea Monitor 
Blood Pressure Monitor 
Ultrasound Scanner 
Hearing Aid 
Audiometer 
Incubator 
Wheelchairs 
2 Respirator ( ID)  2 Respirator 2 
2 lefibrillator I Ventilator 2 
2 Pacemaker I Infusion Pumps 2 
9 MRI Machine I Apnea Monitors 1 
8 Feeding Pump 1 
I Pulse Oximeter I Radiation Therapy Unit I 
2 Radiant Warmer 1 
8 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
2 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
3 
55 6 I O  91 
I Table 2 shows that six deaths occurred due to EM1 with medical equipment. 
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It is interesting to note that F b A  data, like FAA aircraft data, indicate that cellular phones 
are frequent EM1 culprit devices. They have interfered with the operation of incubators, infusion 
pumps and controllers, dialysis equipment, and defibrillators as well as with aircraft systems. A 
large hospital in Chicago and a large healthcare center in Indiana have banned the use of cellular 
phones.2' These phones are also banned in some European hospitals.20 Cellular phones that use the 
new European GSM standard have been reported to produce audible interference in hearing aids up 
to a distance of 30 m. 
Details of several interesting cases concerning medical equipment are given in the following. 
2.3.3.1 Talking EEG Machine 
This case involved EM1 that prevented proper testing of surgically implanted probes used in 
monitoring specific portions of a patient's brain activity. With probes in direct brain contact, the 
potential between any two points is measured on an EEG machine. The EEG provides critical feed- 
back to the surgeon during surgery. This particular EM1 manifested itself on the analog plotting 
needles of the EEG machine as a modulated signal easily recognized as speech-hence a talking 
EEG machine! The EMI-caused noise was so severe that i t  completely,masked the EEG signals 
and made the machine alarmingly ineffectual during surgery. The signal was from a local AM radio 
station, and the noise during surgery was from common impedance coupling between the EEG 
machine and the operating table. Bonding the EEG with the operating table eliminated the EM1 and 
restored the critical brain monitoring function.22 
2.3.3.2 Ambulance Heart MonitorAIefibrillator 
Susceptibility of medical equipment to conducted or radiated emission is a concern. In this 
case, a 93-year-old heart attack victim was being taken to the hospital and the medical technician 
had attached a monitor/defibrillator to the patient. Because the machine shut down every time the 
technicians turned on the radio transmitter to request medical advice, the patient died. An investiga- 
tion showed that the monitor/defibrillator was exposed to exceptionally high radiated emissions 
because the ambulance roof had been changed from metal to fiberglass and fitted with a long-range 
radio antenna. Reduced shielding combined with the strong radiated radio signal resulted in EM1 to 
the vital machine.*' 
2.3.3.3 Runaway Wheelchairs 
Wheelchairs came under the scrutiny of the FDA (fig. 5) because of reported erratic, uninten- 
tional powered-wheelchair movements. These movements included sudden starts that caused 
wheelchairs to drive off curbs or piers when police, fire, or CB transmitters were activated near the 
chairs. Although no fatal injuries have been reported, FDA has ordered manufacturers of motorized 
wheelchairs to shield them from EM1 and to educate users on the potential EM1 hazards.2' 
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Figure 5. Testing a wheelchair for EMI. 
2.3.3.4 Apnea Monitor Case 
A physician at a major university hospital reported that apnea monitors would not work in 
some surrounding neighborhoods. Prolonged sleep apnea (cessation of breathing) is detrimental to 
adults and can be fatal to infants. Other reports of monitor failures prompted the FDA to conduct 
tests. The conclusion that low levels of EM1 detected by commercial apnea monitors could 
erroneously indicate respiration prompted a recall of those particular monitors.20 
2.4 Summary Comments 
A careful review of the cases outlined in this section reinforces the important role EMC 
activities have played in NASA space programs and will play in the future. The important points are 
the following: 
( 1 ) NASA EMC personnel have done a creditable job applying EMC techniques and 
I principles and utilizing past experience to prevent serious in-flight anomalies caused by EMI. 
(2)  The extreme importance of having up-to-date EMC guidelines, standards, and test pro- 
cedures is established. 
( 3 )  Constant and diligent attention must be paid to the EMC of spacecraft systems by 
assuming that every new system is different, and past assumptions on susceptibility to EM1 should 
be carefully reconsidered and thoroughly retested. 
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(4) Any spacecraft anomaly caused by EM1 is serious. Although an anomaly by itself might 
appear trivial, it in combination with a certain series of events may cause irreparable damage to a 
space mission or experiment. 
(5) HIRF can have serious effects on advanced electronic systems. The consequences of 
EM1 on automated electronic systems used for critical functions are increasingly serious. 
(6) Use of COTS hardware potentially increases EM1 risks. 
(7) Everyone working with advanced electrical or electronic systems must be aware of the 
potential consequences of EMI. 
If the old adage “you learn from history to apply to the future” holds true, then NASA EMC 
personnel have built a solid EMC foundation to face a future fraught with new trends to impact EMC 
activities. Before discussing in section 4 the exact nature of these trends, section 3 details the pre- 
sent activities of the MSFC Electromagnetics and Environments Branch in EMC. 
3.0 PRESENT 
Understanding the failures and anomalies reported in these and other case histories will 
enable NASA engineers and program managers to minimize program risks and costs and to optimize 
design quality. The MSFC Electromagnetics and Environments Branch actively pursues develop- 
ment of new techniques and processes to deal with current and future programs and technologies. 
Recently Electromagnetics and Environments Branch personnel developed the MSFC Elec- 
tromagnetic Compatibility Design and Interference Control (MEDIC) handbook. This handbook pro- 
vides practical and helpful EMC information for the designers and manufacturers of electrical sys- 
tems and subsystems. An introduction to EMC, an overview of typical NASA EM1 test require- 
ments, and examples of associated test setups are provided in the handbook. Design techniques to 
minimize the risks of EMI, compliance techniques, and retrofit fixes for noncompliant equipment are 
also included. 
Electromagnetics and Environments Branch personnel are currently engaged in the develop- 
ment, validation, and utilization of the Integrated Space Station Electromagnetic Compatibility 
Analysis System (ISEAS) computer model. This model calculates system-level EMC margins using 
equipment-level EM1 test data and pertinent engineering parameters. ISEAS analyzes EM1 trends 
and predicts EMC levels for all systems and subsystems aboard the International Space Station 
Alpha (ISSA) and numerous other NASA projects. Using ISEAS will enable EMC personnel to 
quickly and accurately make technical decisions. 
4.0 FUTURE 
Current state-of-the-art electronic systems in military and commercial aircraft and in medical 
equipment provide a preview of future spacecraft and payload electronics. The case histories in this 
report reveal the challenges EMC personnel faced as more complex electronic systems are incorpo- 
rated into various programs. An examination of three major trends that state-of-the-art electronics 
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, are now experiencing provides an indication of the nature of these future challenges. Three major 
trends are: 
I ( 1 ) Increasing susceptibility of electronic systems to EM1 
, (2) Increasing use of automated electronic systems in aircraft 
(3)  Increasing pollution of the EME. 
I 
4.1 Increasing Susceptibility of Electronic Systems to EM1 
Electronic systems susceptibility to EM1 is increasing because of the increasing use of low 
voltage or current electronic components, the increasing densities of electronics used in systems, 
and the increasing use of COTS hardware and composite materials. 
To reduce power requirements, integrated circuits chips are designed with transistors that 
require less voltage or current to initiate a change of state. Thus, less magnetic energy is required to 
initiate an upset in the chips circuitry. This results in an electronic component that is more sensitive 
(susceptible) to EMI. 
Increasing densities of state-of-the-art electronics in systems have increased susceptibility 
to EMI. In the past, integrated circuit chips were designed with more circuits and with logic gates in 
smaller areas. Now state-of-the-art electronics place on a chip not only basic circuit elements but 
also complete subsystems and systems. Examples of system-on-a-chip are monolithic and millime- 
ter-wave monolithic integrated circuits (MMIC). MMIC chips contain many communications related 
components in a very small area; a chip one-tenth of an inch square contains all the functions previ- 
ously located on a 5- by 8-inch circuit b0ard.2~ MMIC’s, developed and supported by the Depart- 
ment of Defense, are becoming more attractive to the space industry because of substantial weight 
and space savings. Although EM1 considerations for chips are the designer’s responsibility, the user 
must be cognizant of the fact that many systems-on-a-chip are packed closer together. EMC 
between chips may pose problems now beyond the chip designer’s responsibility. 
Another example of system-on-a-chip is the new generation of multichip modules (MCM). 
They, like MMIC’s, are being advocated by the military because MCM’s allow the high density 
packaging of mixed analog, digital, and microwave devices. They are soon expected to be used in 
commercial applications and space vehicles. Rh~rbaugh*~  indicates that a wide range of potential 
EM1 problems exits in MCM’s in susceptibility to high levels of EMI, crosstalk, and radiated emis- 
sions. He states that MCM’s must be treated as entire systems and EM1 treated on the system 
level using system-wide design rules. Although MCM designers must deal with these considera- 
tions, MCM’s will probably be packed together. Thus, EMC personnel must be prepared to deter- 
mine what EMC specifications must be met for checkout and preflight testing. In fact, the MEDIC 
handbook discussed in section 3 is evidence that EMC personnel are already involved with in-box 
design. 
Because systems and subsystems are now able to be packed so closely together, any EMI, 
especially pulses, increases the risk that an entire subsystem or system (not just a component, gate 
or circuit segment) will be affected. Thus, the impact of any EM1 event becomes potentially more 
serious to a mission or payload. 
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As the PGSC and Pioneer cases in section 2 illustrated, COTS hardware can also contribute 
to EMC problems. If the trend to require using more COTS hardware is adopted by the space 
the field, meets EMC standards. 
I industry, EMC personnel will have to be especially diligent to see that this hardware, especially in 
Increased use of composite materials has spread from military aircraft to commercial air- 
craft.24 Because of the weight savings they afford, composite structures are desirable in aircraft and 
spacecraft, however, increased use of composite materials decreases the EM1 shielding provided by 
metal structures and possibly increases susceptibility to ambient radiation. Research at MSFC into 
implications of composite materials to EMC in spacecraft systems is in the planning stages. Current 
susceptibility protection methods tend to offset the advantages of composite materials by adding 
weight and cost. Researchers anticipate investigating the electrical and electromagnetic properties, 
conductive coatings, and bonding techniques of various conductive materials to find more cost-and- 
weight efficient methods of providing susceptibility protection. EMC personnel will be required to 
draft and evaluate new EMC specifications and procedures as composite materials enter spacecraft 
and payload systems. 
4.2 Increasing Use of Automated Electronic Systems in Aircraft 
Military and commercial aircraft operations are increasing the use of digital electronics to 
provide automated systems such as engine controls, flight surface controls, cockpit displays, sensor 
data (i.e., military targeting, early warning, countermeasures, flight environment), communications, 
and navigation. This trend increases EM1 susceptibility in several ways. First, additional onboard 
electronic systems, whether analog or digital, increase the possibility of EMI. Secondly, digital sys- 
tems by their nature present the increased possibility of radiating electromagnetic energy at high fre- 
quencies that can affect neighboring systems, especially analog systems such as radios. Third, 
automated digital systems have not only replaced critical mechanical, hydraulic, or analog systems, 
but also the human interface. As illustrated in section 2 in the Forrestal, power down, B-52, 
Blackhawk, Apache, and F-16 cases, EM1 susceptibility has become a mission-critical concern, as 
well as a human safety one. 
Even advanced systems using optical fibers, primarily to eliminate potential EM1 problems, 
must be carefully checked and tested for EMI. Fiber-optic systems proved to be susceptible to 
HIRF EM1 because of the existence of poor interconnections within the fiber system.*5 
4.3 Increasing Pollution of the Electromagnetic Environment 
The third major trend is the increasing pollution of the electromagnetic environment (EME). 
Radio, TV, microwave, aircraft power systems, aircraft and automobile electronics, lightning, elec- 
tronic warfare systems, cellular phones, personnel communication systems, direct broadcasting 
systems, and remote sensing systems (radar surveillance of space by world-wide military and sci- 
entific satellite systems) all contribute to this pollution. The EME also includes the near-Earth 
environment of operating spacecraft. As the GRO and NOAA-12 cases in section 2 showed, the 
effects are already being felt and will become more severe as the world continues to advance into the 
information age. Thus, EMC personnel must continue to diligently assess the potential impacts the 
ever-increasing global pollution of the electromagnetic environment has on electronic systems. 
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5.0 SUMMARY 
Hopefully, through the use of illustrative EM1 anomaly case histories, this report has given 
not only insight into the contribution that the NASA EMC activities have made in space programs 
but also a glimpse into the nature of future problems. These case histories suggest that in-flight 
electronic systems used in spacecraft and their experiments will become more susceptible to EMI. 
This is due not only to the sensitivity of the electronics, but also to the increasing reliance on elec- 
tronics to operate and control critical spacecraft systems in an increasingly hostile EME. They also 
suggest the importance of up-to-date EMC guidelines, standards, and test procedures, and of con- 
stant attention given to EMC considerations during spacecraft systems design. 
Past success is due to both the diligence of EMC personnel and the strong commitment of 
NASA. Despite tighter program budgets and closer public scrutiny, this commitment must continue 
to mitigate the increasing risk of mission failure due to inadequate EMC. 
As part of the MSFC commitment, the Electromagnetics and Environments Branch is active 
in the development of new techniques and processes that address current technologies and extend 
an already solid base into the future. 
If you have any questions or comments about this report, contact the MSFC Systems Analy- 
sis and Integration Laboratory, Electromagnetics and Environments Branch, Steven D. Pearson at 
205-544-2350. 
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